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Private Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA
Past hazardous waste disposal practices have created serious present-day problems. Following World War H, the United
States dramatically increased its use of chemicals to produce

the goods of everyday life.' This "better living through chemisry" 2 phenomenon, however, has not been without cost. Until
very recently, the disposal of hazardous chemical waste was
haphazard and essentially unregulated. Large amounts of such
dumped, buried on-site, or shipped to ordiwaste were stored,
3

nary landfills.
As the inevitable consequence of these short-sighted disposal practices, the hazardous waste problem exploded onto the
national scene in the late 1970's and early 1980's. Environnental horror stories abound;4 names such as '"ove Canal,"5
1. As one commentator has notedU.S. production of all synthetic organic chemicals was under one billion pounds in 1941; by 1970, production of the top 50 organic chemicals alone totaled 172 billion pounds. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) noted that production of synthetic chemicals rose from
less than 50 billion [pounds] in 1950 to more than 300 billion by the
late 1970s.
Note, Hazardous Waste Liability and Compensation: Old Solutions, New Solutions,No Solutions, 14 CONN. L. REV. 307, 309 nl (1982) (citations omitted).
The Council on Environmental Quality describes hazardous waste sources as
follows:
Hazardous wastes are produced in many segments of society- industry, hospitals, research facilities, and government. Industry is by far the largest source; according to EPA estimates, the
chemical and allied products industry produces 60 percent of all industrial hazardous wastes ....
Industrial wastes are also generated
in the manufacture of automobiles, energy, paper, plastics, clothing,
rubber, paint, pesticides, medicines, and most other products used
daily.
COUNCIL ON ENVmONMENTAL QUALITY, ELEVENTH ANN. REP. 216 (1980) [hereinafter cited as CEQ, ELEVENTH ANN. REP.].
2. Costle & Beck, Attack on Hazardous Waste. Turning Bac the Toxic
Tide, 9 CAP. U. REV. 425, 425 (1980).
3. EPA estimates that 264 million metric tons of hazardous wastes were
generated in 198L See 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 5 (1985) (citing EPA, NATIONAL
SURVEY OF HAZARDOUS WAsTE GENERATORs AND TREATmNT, STORAGE, AND
DisPosAL FAcILrTIs REGULATED UNDER RCRA IN 1981 (EPA 530/SW-84-

005)). In 1980, EPA estimated that 90% of the hazardous waste generated was
disposed of in an unsound manner. CEQ, ELEVENTH ANN. REP., supra note 1,
at 218.
4. For collected reports of such stories, see M BROWN, LAYING WASTE.
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"Times Beach,"'6 and "Valley of the Drums"7 have been etched
THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY Toxic CHEMICALS (1980); Brown, Drums of
Death, AUDUBON, July, 1980, at 120; Magnuson, The Poisoning of America,
TIME, Sept. 22, 1980, at 58.
5. Love Canal, an uncompleted and abandoned nineteenth century waterway in Niagara Falls, New York, had been used as an industrial dump site
since the 1930's. In 1947, the Hooker Chemical and Plastics Company
purchased the site, capping it in 1953 after thousands of drums of toxic chemical wastes had been buried there. Hooker sold part of the site for one dollar to
the Niagara Falls Board of Education, which constructed an elementary school
and playing field on the site. A developer purchased the remaining land and
built several hundred homes on the periphery of the old canal.
In 1976, six years of above-average rain and snowfall caused the chemicals
dumped there to begin seeping into the basements of the homes adjoining the
site. The New York State Department of Health, after investigating residents'
complaints of unusually large numbers of miscarriages, birth defects, cancer,
and other illnesses, declared the area a "grave and imminent peril" to the
health of those living nearby.
As of July 1979, 263 families had been evacuated, 1000 additional families
had been advised to leave their homes, the site was closed by a barbed wire
fence, and President Carter had declared Love Canal a national disaster area.
See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, TENTH ANN. REP. 176-77 (1979).

Love Canal was the first national disaster declared in response to something
other than an act of God. See id. at 174; see also M. BROWN, supra note 4, at 396; A. LEVINE, LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE (1982); Baurer,
Love Cana: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy, 11 ENVTL. L. 133
(1980).
6. Times Beach was a town of approximately 2200 people located 25
miles southwest of St. Louis. In the early 1970's an industrial waste hauler
named Russell Bliss sprayed the roads in Times Beach with waste oil in order
to control the dust. The waste oil used was contaminated with 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin (dioxin), one of the most toxic synthetic chemicals
known. Samples taken by EPA indicated soil dioxin levels in excess of 100
parts per billion (ppb); by comparison, the Center for Disease Control's recommended maximum soil dioxin level for residential areas is 1 ppb. See Kimbrough, Falk, Stehr & Fries, Health Implications of 2,3,7,8Tetrachlorodibenzodioxin (TCDD) Contamination of Residential Soil, 14 J.
TOXICOLOGY & ENVTL. HEALTH 47, 49 (1984).
Investigators traced the dioxin to Northeastern Pharmaceutical and
Chemical Co. (NEPACCO), which produced dioxin as a byproduct in the manufacture of the disinfectant hexachlorophene. When the market for hexachlorophene collapsed in 1971, NEPACCO went out of business and hired
Independent Petroleum Corp. to dispose of its accumulated wastes. Independent Petroleum in turn hired Russell Bliss. According to the Missouri Department of Natural Resources, Bliss sprayed about 18,500 gallons of dioxincontaminated waste oil at up to 100 locations throughout the state.
In February of 1983, EPA announced that the government would purchase
the entire town of Times Beach using $33.7 million from the federal
Superfund. The State of Missouri contributed an additional $3.3 million to the
buyout.
For general discussions of the Times Beach incident, see Garmon, Dioxin
in Missouri: Troubled Times, 123 Sci. NEWS 60 (1983); Lerner, The Trouble at
Times Beach, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1983, at 24; Posner, Anatomy of a Missouri
Nightmare, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 4, 1983, at 10; Sun, Missouri's Costly Dioxin Les-
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into the public consciousness. These are not isolated accidents;
they are but the tip of the hazardous waste iceberg. In 1980 the
Department of Justice estimated that there were five hundred
to six hundred hazardous waste 8sites as potentially dangerous
as Love Canal if left unattended.
Congress responded to the threat posed by inactive and
abandoned hazardous waste sites by enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA).9 Prior hazardous waste legislation, such as the
Toxic Substances Control Act' 0 and the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act," was inadequate; those statutes were aimed
at preventing future hazardous waste problems from developing but did not address the problems created by past disposal
son, 219 SCI. 367 (1983). See also United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 827-30 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
7. The Valley of the Drums was a five-acre site in Shepardsville, Kentucky (near Louisville), containing an estimated 17,000 fifty-five gallon drums
of hazardous waste, many of which were leaking their toxic contents onto the
ground and into a nearby river. The site had been used by a trucker with a
reputation for emptying the chemicals into a pit and then reusing the drums, a
practice which further compounded the hazardous waste problem. See Benik,
The Environmental Crisis of Hazardous Waste-Superfund, A Congresssional
Response, 17 ARK. LAW. 100 (1983); Valley of the Drums and Other Hazardous
Wastelands 115 Sci. NEWS 68 (1979).
.8. See 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2243 (1980). As of July 1984, EPA had identified some 20,000 potential hazardous waste sites requiring preliminary investigation. The Agency estimated that by the time the investigations were
complete, up to 2200 sites might be placed on the National Priorities List, a list
of sites posing a significant risk to public health or the environment. 15 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 756-57 (1984); see infra note 29.
9. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(1982)).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982). The TSCA is intended to prevent unreasonably hazardous materials from ever entering the environment. It enables
the EPA to regulate all new and existing chemical substances for which "there
is a reasonable basis to conclude" that the substance "presents or will present
an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(a). Sections 2603, 2604, and 2605 contain the substantive provisions of
the Act, establishing a system of testing, premanufacturing clearance, and,
where appropriate, regulation of manufacturing and distribution. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2603-2605.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1982). The hazardous waste provisions are contained in Subchapter HI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934. The RCRA is a managementoriented act intended to control hazardous waste from the point of generation
through transportation, storage, and ultimate disposal. It establishes standards for generators (§ 6922), transporters (§ 6923), and storage and disposal
facilities (§ 6924). The establishment of a manifest system (§§ 6922(5),
6923(a)(3), and 6924(2)) allows EPA to track hazardous wastes from "cradle to
grave.
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practices. 12 CERCLA was intended to fill that gap.
CERCLA is a comprehensive approach to the problem of
abandoned hazardous waste sites. Section 9603 establishes a
system for collecting information on hazardous waste sites
throughout the country. Section 9604 authorizes governmentconducted cleanups at sites where a responsible party cannot be
located or will not take the necessary remedial action. Section
13
9605 requires that the National Contingency Plan (the Plan)
be revised to provide a framework for government response actions and directs that particularly dangerous sites be ranked by
degree of hazard on a list of priority response targets called the
National Priorities List (the List).14 Section 9631 establishes a
12. The RCRA does contain one provision that may be used to address
past disposal practices. Section 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a), enables EPA to compel the cleanup of hazardous waste sites posing an "imminent and substantial
endangerment" to public health or the environment. Experience, however,
has shown § 7003 to be of limited utility. It does not apply to the thousands of
dormant sites not currently posing an "imminent and substantial endangerment," a standard that is often difficult to meet. See Note, Liabilityfor Generators of Hazardous Waste: The Failureof Existing Enforcement Mechanisms,
69 GEo. L.J. 1047, 1055 n.50 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Georgetown Note].
Furthermore, § 7003 applies only when the site owner is identifiable and financially able to remedy the problem, and it does not apply to nonnegligent offsite generators or transporters of hazardous wastes. See United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 836-37 (W.D. Mo.
1984). Some courts further restrict § 7003 by interpreting it as merely providing jurisdiction, and not as establishing standards for determining whether an
injunction should be issued. See, e.g., United States v. Solvents Recovery Serv.,
496 F. Supp. 1127, 1133-34 (D.Conn. 1980); United States v. Midwest Solvent
Recovery, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 138, 143 (N.D. Ind. 1980). But see United States v.
Diamond Shamrock Corp., 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20,819, 20,821,
17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329, 1332 (N.D. Ohio May 29, 1981).
CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a), is very similar to RCRA § 7003.
Both allow EPA to compel the cleanup of hazardous waste sites posing an "imminent and substantial endangerment" to the public health or welfare or the
environment. Section 106(a), however, generally is more effective than RCRA
§ 7003, primarily because CERCLA adopts a broader definition of "responsible
parties." See, e.g., United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F. Supp. 54, 57
(N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100,
1113 (D.Minn. 1982).
For a general discussion of CERCLA § 106(a) administrative orders, see
EPA, MEMORANDUM ON USE AND ISSUANCE OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDERS
UNDER SECTION 106(a) OF CERCLA (Sept. 8, 1983), reprinted in ENV'T REP.
(BNA), Federal Laws Index 41:2931; Comment, Abating an Imminent Hazard:
Injunctive Relief Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 32 BUFFALO L. REV. 787, 805-16 (1983);
Note, The Role of Injunctive Relief and Settlements in Superfund Enforcemen4 68 CORNELL L. REV. 706, 711-18 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Cornell
Note].
13. See infra note 27.
14. See infra note 29.
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$1.6 billion "Superfund" (or Fund) to finance government
cleanup efforts.15 Section 9611 sets out the authorized uses of
the Fund, and section 9612 details the procedures for making
claims against the Fund. Finally, section 960716 makes those
parties who were responsible for creating the problem liable for
the costs of cleaning it up.17
15. Of the money in the Superfund, 86.2% is raised through a tax levied
on importers of crude oil and manufacturers of petrochemical feedstocks and
toxic organic chemicals. The remaining 13.8% comes from general revenues.
See COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrTY, TWELFrH ANN. REP. 99 (1981).
16. Section 9607(a) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only
to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section(1) the owner and operator of a vessel (otherwise subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States) or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or
possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility
owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances
for transport to disposal or treatment facilities or sites selected by
such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency plan; and
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,
destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
17. CERCLA's liability provisions are broad. Responsible parties subject
to liability include the current owner and operator of the site, the owner and
operator at the time of disposal, any party that transported hazardous material
to a disposal or treatment facility of its own choosing, and any party that arranged for the disposal or treatment of hazardous material at the site or for
the transportation of such material to the site. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(3). Furthermore, CERCLA liability extends to even nonnegligent off-site generators
and transporters. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem.
Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Georgetown Note, supra note 12, at
1055.
CERCLA does not explicitly mention strict liability, but the legislative
history indicates, and the courts have held, that responsible parties are to be
held strictly liable. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp.
1135, 1140 n4 (E.D. Pa. 1982); see also Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto

Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1442-43 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Northeastern
Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 844 (W.D. Mo. 1984). Federal
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Section 9607(a)(4) imposes liabiltiy on parties responsible
for a hazardous release. Such parties are liable for:
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State not inconsistent with the national contingency plan, [and]
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan .... is

Subsection (A) is the government cost recovery provision,
which allows the government to sue for costs incurred in cleaning up a site. Any money recovered goes back into the Fund
for future Fund-financed responses. Subsection (B) is the private cost recovery provision, providing two distinct types of private cost recovery actions. First, a private party may make a
claim against the Superfund to recover its response costs.
These types of claims are rare because the party making the
claim must have "clean hands"'19 and must satisfy certain other
common law apparently governs the imposition of joint and several liability.
See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255 (S.D. Ill.
1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Note,
Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Releases Under Superfund,
68 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1165-66, 1173-74 (1982). Some courts have held, however,
that the imposition of joint and several liability should be tempered by a "fairness test" when a defendant is found to have contributed only a small amount
of waste to the site. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp.
1249, 1256-57 (S.D. Ill.
1984); United States v. Stringfellow, 14 ENvTL. L. Ru_.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,385, 20,387, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1905, 1910 (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 5, 1984). At least one court has suggested that state law should control
the issue of joint and several liability. See Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1443 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
The only recognized defenses to liability are set out in 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (liability is "subject only to the defenses set forth in
subsection (b) of this section"); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (D. Minn. 1982). A responsible party will not be held liable
if it can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the release or
threat of release was caused solely by an act of God, an act of war, or the act of
a vandal or other third party beyond the contract that could not have been
prevented by the exercise of due care. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). Section 9607(c) establishes broad limitations on liability. Courts, however, have refused to impose liability for response costs incurred prior to the enactment of CERCLA
on December 10, 1980. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20,843, 20,844
(E.D. Va. May 14, 1982), affd, 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
19. A responsible party theoretically could file a claim against the Fund
for its response costs. See 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2). EPA undoubtedly would resist such a claim on grounds that the Fund was intended to finance government responses and to compensate private "volunteers," and not to reimburse
responsible parties. The fact that CERCLA imposes joint and several liability
on responsible parties would strongly support this interpretation.
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preconditions2 0 In the second type of private cost recovery ac-

tion, a private party sues another private party directly, and no
claim is made against the Fund.2 ' These actions are more com-

mon because a party need not have "clean hands" in order to
bring suit; rather, a responsible party who undertakes a
cleanup may sue other responsible parties to recover a portion
of its cleanup costs.2 2 This Note focuses on the latter type of
claims, those against responsible parties rather than against the

Fund.
Although courts agree that CERCLA authorizes private
cost recovery actions, they do not agree on the circumstances in
which such actions are permissible. The statutory language is
ambiguous, and CERCLA's legislative history provides little
guidance.23 As more private cleanups are conducted, often at
staggering costs, 24 the rules governing private cost recovery ac20. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a) (claimant must notify responsible parties
60 days before seeking recovery from the Fund); 40 C.F1.R § 300.25(d) (1984)
(government preauthorization of cleanup plan is a prerequisite to a claim
against the Fund).
21. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 283, 288-89 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co.,
589 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 588 F. Supp. 515, 517 (D.Mass. 1983); Jones v. Inmont Corp.,
584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (S.D. Ohio 1984); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem.
Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135,1143 (EfD. Pa. 1982); Wetmer v. Syntex Corp., 14 ENVTL.
ILREP. (ENVTh. L. INsT.) 20, 5, 20,266 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 30,1983).
22. See Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 283, 291 (N.D. Cal. 1984); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135, 1141-42 (E.D. Pa.1982). This is a particularly important provision because, given the broadly drawn liability provisions of CERCLA, almost
any party in a position to undertake a voluntary cleanup would necessarily be
a responsible party.
23. As one commentator has notedAlthough Congress had worked on "Superfund" toxic and hazardous
waste cleanup bills ... for over three years, the actual bill which became law had virtually no legislative history at all. The bill which became law was hurriedly put together by a bipartisan leadership group
of senators (with some assistance from their House counterparts), introduced, and passed by the Senate in lieu of all other pending measures on the subject. It was then placed before the House ... [and]
considered on December 3, 1980, in the closing days of the lame duck
session of an outgoing Congress. It was considered and passed, after
very limited debate, under a suspension of the rules, in a situation
which allowed for no amendments.
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensationand Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUmn. J. ENVm.L
1, 1 (1982) (footnote omitted).
24. For example, FMC Corp. has spent $4 million to date in its voluntary
cleanup of a hazardous waste site in Fridley, Minnesota. FMC contends the
entire cleanup project will cost in excess of $6 million and has filed a private
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tions become increasingly important. A review of the cases
reveals four major areas of disagreement among the courts.
These points of disagreement include the procedures necessary
for a private cleanup to be "consistent with the national contingency plan," the types of expenditures that rise to the level of
"necessary costs of response," the point in a cleanup when response costs are "incurred" and thus become recoverable, and,
finally, the notice requirements that apply in private cost recovery actions. This Note discusses each of these problems and
suggests a resolution consistent with the policies of CERCLA.
I.

PRIVATE CLEANUP PROCEDURES "CONSISTENT
WITH THE NATIONAL CONTINGENCY PLAN"

The requirement that private cleanup procedures be "consistent with the national contingency plan" 25 is confusing because CERCLA does not define the term "consistent." 26 The
Plan itself does not deal expressly with private cleanups;
rather, it was promulgated to provide guidelines for government response actions utilizing Superfund money. 27 Because
cost recovery action against other allegedly responsible parties. See Mpls. Star
and Trib., Jan. 3, 1985, at 1B, col. 1; see also State ex rel Brown v. Georgeoff,
562 F. Supp. 1300, 1315 n.18 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (estimated cost of $10 million to
clean up site); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135,
1139 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (estimated cost of $10 million to clean up site).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
26. In imposing the consistency requirement, Congress probably was concerned with the first type of private cost recovery action, in which the claim is
made against the Fund. If so, the consistency requirement would serve the
same function as under subsection (A), that of conserving limited Fund assets.
See infra note 28.
27. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.81 (1984). The National Contingency Plan was initially promulgated pursuant to § 1321 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1321(c)(2) (1982), but was revised pursuant to § 9605 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9605. Subpart F, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.61-.71 (1984), deals with hazardous substance response.
The Plan establishes three levels of response to significant releases of hazardous substances. The first level, "immediate removal," 40 C.F.R. § 300.65, is
used in acute situations in which quick response is imperative to prevent or
mitigate the risk of significant and immediate harm to human life or health, or
to the environment. Examples of immediate removal situations include exposure of humans, animals, or the food chain to acutely toxic substances, contamination of a drinking water supply, or a significant risk of fire or explosion.
An immediate removal is complete when the situation is no longer acute. In
some instances, a terminated immediate removal action will be followed by
one of the other two levels of response.
The second level of response, "planned removal," 40 C.F.R. § 300.67, is a
more comprehensive response undertaken in less imminently threatening situations. Planned removal is appropriate when substantial cost savings could be
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the $1.6 billion allocated to the Fund was insufficient to remedy
the dangers posed by the thousands of hazardous waste sites
throughout the country,2s Congress ordered EPA to compile a
"National Priorities List" of the worst hazardous waste sites in
the country. 29 The National Contingency Plan for the most
part limits government-sponsored cleanups to sites included on
realized by continuing a terminated immediate removal since equipment and
other resources already have been mobilized, or where the public or environment would be at risk if response was delayed at a site not on the National
Priorities List.
The third level of response, "remedial action," 40 C.F.R. § 300.68, provides
a long-term remedy to releases from sites on the National Priorities List.
Since both immediate removal and planned removal actions have spending
ceilings of one million dollars, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.65(d), 300.67(e), the majority of Superfund money is spent on remedial actions at sites on the National
Priorities List. As a consequence, the regulations governing remedial actions
require extensive site investigation, the development of alternative cleanup
strategies, the screening of alternatives on the basis of cost, and, finally, a consideration of the total cost of cleanup at the site in relation to the amount of
money left in the Superfund. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.68(k).
28. Commenting on the lack of Superfund monies available to meet
cleanup demands, one court has observed:
At the time that CERCLA was enacted, Congress was aware that the
costs of the clean up envisioned would greatly exceed the amount of
the Superfund ....
ITihe low estimate for the clean up was in excess of $7 billion. The highest figure, a figure supported by the EPA,
placed the total cost... at $44 billion. Other references placed the
expected cost... in the range of $13.1 to $22.1 billion.
State ex reL Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1313 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (citations omitted).
29. Section 9605(8) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9605(8), directs that criteria
be established for evaluating the degree of hazard posed by various sites, and
that a list of sites posing a significant risk to public health and the environment be prepared. This list, called the National Priorities List, is promulgated
as Appendix B to the National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300, app. B. EPA
determines which sites to include on the List by using the Hazard Ranking
System (HRS), 40 C.F.R. § 300, app. A. The criteria set out in the HRS for
evaluating the degree of hazard include the population at risk, the hazardous
potential of the substances involved, and the potential for contamination of
drinking water supplies or other significant damage. The HRS ultimately
yields a numerical score reflecting the degree of hazard posed by a particular
site. Minor variations in the HRS score, however, do not necessarily indicate
that one site is more hazardous than another. See 48 Fed. Reg. 40,658, 40,660
(1983). For this reason, EPA lists sites on the List in groups of 50, and each
site within a group has approximately the same priority for remedial action.
Id. EPA maintains that the List is simply an informational tool for identifying
sites appropriate for remedial action; sites will not necessarily receive remedial
attention in the order they appear on the List. Id at 40,659. Furthermore, the
List does not determine priorities for emergency response or planned removal
actions under §§ 300.65 and 300.67 of the Plan. Id; see supra note 27.
As of October 1984, 538 sites were included on the List, and EPA had just
proposed that 208 additional sites be listed. See 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 756-57,
887 (1984).
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the National Priorities List,30 thereby ensuring that Superfund
the greatmonies will be spent primarily on sites representing
31
est threat to public health and the environment.
Whether private cleanups also should be so limited is unclear. In one of the earliest cases interpreting CERCLA's private cost recovery provision, a federal district court in
California held that in order for a private cleanup to be "consistent with the national contingency plan," the site in question
had to be included on the National Priorities List. 32 More re-

cent decisions quite properly have refused to follow this court's
lead. 33 Limiting private cleanups to sites on the List is not nec30. See supra note 27.
31. As one Senator stated:
The plan will contain guidance on cost-effectiveness. Such guidelines
are intended to assure that alternative remedial options are considered when planning cleanup actions at a particular site. This guidance
will also provide both criteria and procedures for selection of the most
cost-effective and environmentally sound alternative for remedying
the site. This selection will require a balancing of a variety of factors,
including cost and engineering, to achieve the health and environmental goals of the legislation.
126 CONG. REC. S14965 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Randolph)
(cited in City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1144 n.16
(E.D. Pa. 1982)).
32. Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chemical Co., 14 ENVTL. L. REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,376, 20,379, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1114-15 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 5, 1984). The California district court, apparently relying on § 300.68
of the National Contingency Plan, see supra note 27, stated that:
Defendants argue that as a minimal prerequisite to commenc[ing] suit
under . . .§ 9607, the site must appear on the [National Priorities]
List. This appears to be correct, or the requirement that the action be
"consistent with the National Contingency Plan" would have no
meaning.
To permit private suits ... would undermine the perceived Congressional intent to provide a systematic unified response to hazardous waste problems ....
Id.at 20,379, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1114-15.
On motion for reconsideration, the court retracted this holding, stating
that its previous order had been "mischaracterized."
Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co., 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL.L.
INST.) 20,716, 20,717 n.1, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1584 n.1 (C.D. Cal. Aug 29,
1984).

33. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 283, 290 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("the limitation . . .of remedial actions to
[sites included] on the NPL applies only for purposes of response financed by
Superfund"); New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 302 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) ("[ilt is clear beyond doubt that the liability provisions are independent
of the national priorities list"); Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589
F. Supp. 1437, 1445 n.18 (S.D. Fla. 1984) ("[t]he result in CadillacFair-view is
neither supported by the NCP nor the case law").
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essary because the compensation in such cases comes from one
or more of the responsible parties, not from the Superfund.
Additionally, prohibiting private cleanups of all but the most
hazardous sites4 frustrates CERCLA's policy of encouraging
prompt cleanup of hazardous waste.as Finally, the Plan itself
permits the recovery of costs incurred in cleaning up sites not
included on the List.36 The more recent decisions therefore are
correct in holding that a site does not have to be included on
the National Priorities List in order for a private cleanup to be
"consistent" with the National Contingency Plan.1
Even those courts that agree in rejecting the listing requirement disagree with respect to the amount of government
involvement that is necessary for a private cleanup to be consistent with the Plan. One court has emphatically held that no
government involvement is necessary. 38 Another court has
34. Of the estimated 20,000 hazardous waste sites in the United States,
only 538 are currently on the List, with 208 additional sites proposed for listing. See 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 756-57, 887 (1984); supra note 29.
35. See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1428 (SD. Ohio 1984)
(key objective of CERCLA is to facilitate prompt cleanup by financing private
responses); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135, 1143
(EMD. Pa. 1982) (same).
36. Sections 300.65 and 300.67 permit government cleanups at sites not
listed on the National Priorities List, and those costs are recoverable. See 40
C.F.R. §§ 300.65, .67.
37. See supra note 33.
38. Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp.
283, 289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The Pinole court relied primarily on § 30025(d)
of the National Contingency Plan, which states:
If any person other than the Federal government or a State or person
operating under contract or cooperative agreement with the United
States, takes response action and intends to seek reimbursement from
the Fund, such actions to be in conformity with this Plan for purposes
of section Mll(a)(2) of CERCLA [42 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (1982)] may
only be undertaken if such person notifies the Administrator of EPA
or his/her designee prior to taking such action and receives prior approval to take such action.
40 C.F.R. § 300.25(d).
When EPA promulgated the final version of the Plan, it explained this
section a follows:
[Section 300.25(d)] has been rewritten to require that persons who intend to undertake response actions, and seek reimbursement from the
Fund, must obtain preauthorization in order for the response action to
be considered consistent with the Plan ....
Section 300.25(d) does not apply to private partieswho undertake
response actions, but do not intend to seek reimbursementfrom the
Fund.
47 Fed. Reg. 31,180, 31,196 (1982) (emphasis added). EPA states that the
preauthorization requirement is necessary both to ensure that Fund money is
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held that although a private party may initiate a cleanup, the
government must approve the plan prior to cleanup in order
for costs to be recoverable. 39 A third court has held that the
spent in a cost effective manner and to ensure that private response actions
are conducted in an environmentally sound manner. Id Although the first rationale does not apply in a private cost recovery situation because no claim will
be made against the Fund, the second rationale applies even when no
Superfund money is involved.
39. Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1444
(S.D. Fla. 1984) ("before a private claimant can commence a remedial operation and cost recovery action, it must first win government approval of Its
cleanup plan").
The Bulk court based its argument for government preauthorization primarily on the presence of the word "other" in § 9607(a)(4)(B). Section
9607(a)(4) holds responsible parties liable for "(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government ."
and "(B) any
other necessary costs ... incurred by any other person

....

"

42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a)(4)(A), (B) (emphasis added). The court argued that reading subsection (B) in conjunction with subsection (A) requires that some governmental
response costs be incurred before a private party can sue to recover its costs.
A contrary interpretation would render the word "other" mere surplusage,
which is contrary to the tenet that statutes be interpreted in a manner that
gives meaning to all of its terms. Bulk, 589 F. Supp. at 1447.
This argument, however, eventually collapses of its own weight. Tying
subsection (B) to subsection (A) means the government must incur not merely
costs, but specifically "costs of removal or remedial action," also known as response costs. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. Although determining whether a particular cost constitutes a response cost is not easy, de
minimus costs such as those incurred in writing a notice letter or approving a
privately prepared cleanup plan, standing alone, clearly do not rise to the level
of response costs. See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, requiring government expenditures that do rise to the
level of response costs, such as a Fund-financed cleanup or a government-negotiated private cleanup, would severely restrict private cost recovery actions
and frustrate CERCLA's policy of encouraging prompt cleanup of hazardous
waste sites. As the Bulk court itself noted:
The private cost recovery action ... is necessary because the $1.6 Billion Superfund itself will not provide sufficient funds for the cleanup
of existing dumpsites .... Some estimates place the number of sites

requiring attention in the thousands, with projected costs for the
cleanup effort ranging from $7 billion to $44 billion. Obviously, state
and private actions are needed to clean up those sites beyond the
reach of Fund-sponsored actions.
Bulk, 589 F. Supp. at 1444 (citations omitted)(footnote omitted).
The Bulk court argued alternatively that government preauthorization of
the cleanup is required in order for the cleanup to be consistent with the National Contingency Plan. Id at 1447. The court relied primarily on a section
of the Plan governing "remedial actions," which states:
As an alternative or in addition to Fund-financed remedial action, the
lead agency may seek, through voluntary agreement or administrative
or judicial process, to have those persons responsible for the release
clean up in a manner that effectively mitigates and minimizes damage
to, and provides adequate protection of, public health, welfare, and
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consistency requirement demands that the cleanup be initiated
by the government rather than by a private party. 40
To determine which approach best effectuates CERCLA's
policy of abating environmental hazards promptly, safely, and
efficiently, it is necessary to consider the circumstances in
which private cost recovery actions arise. Such actions arise
primarily in three contexts. First, the government may undertake a cleanup using Superfund money, and private parties may
incur associated incidental costs. 4 ' Second, private cost recovery actions may arise if the government sends a notice letter2
to the allegedly responsible party or parties indicating that a
problem exists and offering the chance for private cleanup
rather than a governmental cleanup. After negotiations, the
private parties may engage in voluntary cleanup activities pursuant to an approved plan, often in return for a full or partial
release from liability.4 In the third context, the government is
the environment The Lead agency shall evaluate the adequacy of
clean-up proposalssubmitted by the responsibleparties ....
40 C.F.R. § 300.68(c) (emphasis added). This provision does not apply in either
"immediate removal" or "planned removal" situations, however. See 40 CF.R
§§ 300.65, .67; supra note 27 and accompanying text.
40. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72, 77 (NJ). Cal.
1984) ("an authorized governmental cleanup program, initiated by the EPA or
by state authorities pursuant to a cooperative agreement, must commence
before a private party can state a claim for damages under CERCLA"). The
Wickland court based its argument on the word "other" in § 9607(a)(4)(B) and
on the language of § 300.68(c) of the National Contingency Plan. Wicdand,
590 F. Supp. at 77-78.
41. See, e.g., Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1429 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (government conducted cleanup pursuant to Plan; private parties sued to
recover, among other things, costs of medical testing and provision of alternative water supplies). Other examples might include the costs of evacuating
homes, drinking-water tests, or measures to prevent leakage of wastes into a
homeowner's basement.
42. Before initiating a Fund-financed response activity, EPA attempts to
notify all potentially responsible parties that can be identified of their potential liability. It invites those parties to engage in negotiations in an effort to
develop a mutually satisfactory cleanup agreement. This procedure provides
an opportunity for private cleanup in lieu of government response, thereby
conserving Fund assets, and also serves to put a party on notice as to its potential liability. A notice letter is not a legal prerequisite to cost recovery, however. EPA, GUIDELINES FOR USING THE IWAJNENT HAZARD, ENFORcEhENT,
AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE AUTHORITIES OF SUPERFUND AND OTHER STAT.

UTES, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,664, 20,666 (1982). This preliminary notice letter should

not be confused with the demand letter required under the National Contingency Plan when a party is making a claim against the Fund. See infra notes
82-85 and accompanying text.
43. Negotiated settlements between EPA and responsible parties often
have been successful. See generally Cornell Note, supra note 12, at 711-30 (discussing EPA-negotiated settlements). EPA will negotiate only if potentially
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not involved in the cleanup at all; rather, the private party acts
on its own initiative and then seeks to recover from other responsible parties."
Each of these situations raises different concerns. If a private party incurs costs incidental to a government cleanup, or if
the EPA sends a notice letter and then negotiates a private
cleanup, the cleanup generally will proceed in accordance with
an approved plan. In both of these general situations, however,
there may be individual cases in which a private party incurred
cleanup costs without prior approval. For example, a homeowner may believe that government cleanup is inadequate in
some respects and engage in a supplemental private cleanup effort. These costs would be concurrent with, but independent of,
the government cleanup. Similarly, a private party may overlook the statement in the notice letter that prior approval is required, undertake the cleanup, and then seek to recover from
other responsible parties. In these cases, the courts must determine whether these unauthorized costs are recoverable in a
suit against a private party.
As a general rule, government preauthorization should be
required as a precondition to suits against other private parties.
Prior approval protects the public interest by ensuring that the
responsible parties are willing to fund a "substantial proportion" of the response. See EPA, FINAL DRAFr VERSION OF INTERIM Poucy DEVELOPED BY
EPA, JUSTICE ON PRIVATE PARTY CLEANUP SETrLEMENTS UNDER SUPERFUND

(Nov. 29, 1984), reprintedin 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1356, 1357 (1984). For a discussion of factors to consider when negotiating settlements, see Chesler,
Clean-Up of Hazardous Waste Sites Under Superfund: Considerationsfor
CorporateCounse 18 LAw NOTES 115 (1982).
44. Voluntary cleanups may involve either "innocent" or "responsible"
parties. For example, homeowners affected by hazardous wastes might take
steps necessary to protect their homes and property before the government is
involved or before the scope of the problem is fully comprehended. See, e.g.,
M. BROWN, supra note 4, at 6 (Love Canal homeowners repeatedly cleaned and
attempted to seal basements to prevent the influx of hazardous wastes). On
the other hand, a responsible party who is aware of a problem that eventually
will be addressed by EPA or the state may decide to clean up voluntarily
before drums corrode or toxic chemicals contaminate the soil and groundwater. See, e.g., Pinole Point Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F.
Supp. 283, 287 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (no governmental action whatsoever taken
with respect to plaintiffs' land); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544
F. Supp. 1135, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (claim against generators for response costs
under § 9607(a)(4)(B) allowed where city voluntarily spent portion of estimated $10 million necessary to clean up hazardous waste site).
It is important to note that, based on the literal language of the court in
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72, 77 (N.D. Cal. 1984), a
purely voluntary cleanup would never be compensable because it could never
be "initiated by the EPA or appropriate state agency." See supra note 40.
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cleanup will be conducted properly and that it will completely
abate the problem. 45 In addition, the government has the technical expertise necessary to evaluate the adequacy of the suggested engineering practices and is intimately familiar with the
laws applicable to the disposal of the removed wastes. Furthermore, having an EPA-approved plan undoubtedly would make
it easier for a private party to later argue that the response
costs incurred were both "necessary" and "consistent with the
[substantive provisions of the] national contingency plan." 48
The best approach, therefore, is to require government approval of private cleanup plans whenever possible.
In certain situations, however, requiring prior approval
may lead to inequitable results. For example, if the EPA or a
state agency has not been involved, the cleanup plan will not
have prior approval, 47 yet denying recovery would be unfair to
those parties who engage in good-faith, voluntary cleanups, incur large expenses, and then seek to recover a portion of their
costs from other responsible parties. 48 Homeowners who act to
protect their property before the government responds also
would be unfairly denied recovery if prior government approval
of cleanup plans were required in all cases.49 Thus, courts
should create an exception to the prior-approval rule for goodfaith cleanup efforts in cases in which a party was not aware of
the requirement of prior approval. Such an exception would
not prejudice the interests of the other responsible parties; the
requirements that the costs be "necessary" and "consistent"
with the substantive requirements of the National Contingency
Plan should serve to protect their interests by ensuring that response costs are reasonable under the circumstances.
In addition to the procedural requirement of government
45. See Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437,
1446 (S.D.Fla. 1984).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B); see infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.

47. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
48. See, eg., City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 544 F. Supp. 1135,
1139 (E-D. Pa. 1982) (city voluntarily spent a portion of estimated $10 million
necessary for cleanup and then sought recovery from other responsible
parties).
49. See supra note 44. Although prior approval is desirable in this situation, as a practical matter it will not be present regardless of the law. Parties
will be acting on an ad hoc basis in response to their immediate situation. Requiring prior approval probably will not modify their behavior, it will simply
allow the responsible parties to avoid liability. Furthermore, the innocent victims of another's waste will be left without any remedy whatsoever if government approval is a prerequisite to filing a claim against the Superfund. See
suprm note 38.
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preauthorization, the National Contingency Plan also imposes
certain substantive requirements on a plaintiff bringing a private cost recovery action. At trial, the plaintiff has the burden
of showing that the costs incurred actually were consistent with
the Plan.50 For Fund-financed cleanups, the federal government has implemented extensive recordkeeping procedures
that enable it to show that the response taken was both necessary and cost-effective. 51 Private parties, who face a more stringent burden of proof than the federal government,5 2 must be
able to show at least as much. A private plaintiff must demonstrate that alternative cleanup strategies were considered, and
that the strategy chosen was the least costly alternative that
was technologically feasible and reliable, yet still provided adequate protection of public health and the environment.5 3 To
meet this burden, a potential plaintiff will have to create a "paper trail" documenting all steps in the decision-making process.
Having an EPA-approved plan, if possible, would significantly
strengthen a private party's claim that its response costs were
consistent with the National Contingency Plan.
II.

EXPENDITURES AS "NECESSARY COSTS OF
RESPONSE"

The factfinder must determine which cleanup costs are
"necessary" on a case-by-case basis. CERCLA does provide
some guidance, however, in determining which expenditures
will be considered "response costs." CERCLA does not define
50. See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 304 (N.D.N.Y.
1984); Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1444 (S.D.
Fla. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
51. See EPA, MEMORANDUM ON COST RECOVERY AcTiONS UNDER CERCLA (Aug. 26, 1983), reprinted in ENV'T REP. (BNA) Federal Laws Index
41:2861, 41:2863-64 & app. C. EPA apparently is revising its cost documenta.
tion procedures and developing a computer version. See 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA)
1284 (Nov. 23, 1984).
52. Compare the requirement under § 9607(a)(4)(B), that private parties
prove their response costs are consistent with the Plan, with the requirement
under § 9607(a)(4)(A), that the government's response costs be not inconsis.
tent with the Plan. Courts have interpreted the latter language in two ways.
Some place the burden on the government to show that the costs were not inconsistent, see, e.g., Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp.
1437, 1444 (S.D. Fla. 1984), whereas others place the burden on the defendant
to prove the government's costs were inconsistent, see, e.g., New York v. Gen-

eral Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984).

53. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.68.
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the phrase "response costs," but it does define the word "re-4
sponse" as "remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action."
Presumably, any costs associated with these activities would be
recoverable. "Remove" and "removal" include actions necessary to clean up or remove hazardous substances from the environment; to monitor, assess, and evaluate a release or threat of
release; to dispose of removed material; and to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the environment or public health.-a
Specific examples include installing security fencing and providing alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and
housing, and other emergency assistance.s6 CERCLA defines
"remedy" and "remedial action" as actions consistent with a
permanent remedy, taken to minimize the present and future
damage done by hazardous substances at the site.5 7 Specific ex54. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25).

55. Section 9601(23) provides:
"[R]emove" or "removal" means the cleanup or removal of released
hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be
necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to
monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of
such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment,
which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release. The
term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing
or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not
otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 ....
42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).
56. Id
57. Section 9601(24) provides:
"[R]emedy" or "remedial action" means those actions consistent with
permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal actions
in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the environment, to prevent or minimize the release of
hazardous substances so that they do not migrate to cause substantial
danger to present or future public health or welfare or the environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection
using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of
released hazardous substances or contaminated materials, recycling or
reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging
or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection
of leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of
alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to
assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the
environment The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of
residents and businesses and community facilities where the President determines that, alone or in combination with other measures,
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amples include containment actions, neutralization, recycling,
treatment or incineration, permanent relocation of residents,
and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that the actions taken protect the public and the environment. 58
Although the statutory definition of "response" includes
nearly every conceivable activity associated with the cleanup of
a hazardous waste site, and although the EPA takes a very
broad view of the types of expenditures that are recoverable,5 9
courts have failed to provide consistent determinations of what
types of costs constitute response costs. This inconsistency is
particularly apparent in the courts' treatment of costs incurred
prior to the actual cleanup. Some courts have held that response costs do not include the expenses incurred in preliminary activities such as inspecting the site, sampling and
analyzing wastes, erecting security fencing, or drafting cleanup
proposals. 60 Other courts have reached the opposite conclusion,
such relocation is more cost-effective than and environmentally preferable to the transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure
disposition offsite of hazardous substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health or welfare. The term does not include offsite transport of hazardous substances, or the storage,
treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of such hazardous
substances or contaminated materials unless the President determines
that such actions (A) are more cost-effective than other remedial actions, (B) will create new capacity to manage, in compliance with subtitle C of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, hazardous substances In
addition to those located at the affected facility, or (C) are necessary
to protect public health or welfare or the environment from a present
or potential risk which may be created by further exposure to the
continued presence of such substances or materials ....
42 U.S.C. § 9601(24).
58. Id.
59. The costs listed by EPA as recoverable under CERCLA include the
following1. Investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information-gathering necessary or appropriate to identify the existence
and extent of the release or threat thereof, the source and nature of
the hazardous substances, pollutants or contaminants involved, and
the extent of danger to the public health, welfare or the environment.
2. Planning, legal, fiscal, economic, engineering, architectural,
and other studies or investigations necessary or appropriate to plan
and direct response actions.
3. Planning, legal, fiscal, economic, engineering, architectural
and other services necessary to recover the cost of response actions.
EPA, MEMORANDUM ON CosT RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA (Aug. 26,
1983), reprinted in ENV'T REP. (BNA), Federal Laws Index 41:2861, 41:2868,

app. A.
60. See, e.g., Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437,
1450 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (costs of investigating and drafting proposals to clean up a
spill, as well as attorneys' fees, are not response costs); Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 14 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
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finding that such costs are recoverable response costs. 61 This
confusion apparently stems from the courts' reluctance to engage in protracted liability determinations before any remedial
measures have been taken at the site. One of CERCLA's underlying purposes is to encourage site cleanup prior to the determination of liability. 62 If investigatory costs were considered
to be "response costs," a private party could file suit before the
actual site cleanup had begun, thereby frustrating this policy.
Private plaintiffs tend to file suit as early as the court will allow in order to recover costs expended and, more importantly,
to obtain a declaratory judgment on the issue of liability for future cleanup expenses. This tendency is both understandable
and reasonable; it is difficult for a private party undertaking a
cleanup to plan rationally without knowing what other parties
will be required to contribute.
Some courts have avoided the problem of early filing by
holding that investigatory costs are not response costs and then
INsT.) 20,376, 20,381, 21 Envt Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108, 1118 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5,
signs, hiring a
1984) (costs of fencing off site, putting up "No Trespassi'
guard, and conducting chemical analyses of the hazardous substances are not
response costs); D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248, 253 (D.N.J. 1983)
(government cleanup and feasibility study is not a response cost); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 12 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENvTIL L INsT.) 20843,
20,844 (E.D. Va. May 14, 1982) (costs of inspecting the waste site and sampling
chemicals are not response costs), affd, 714 F.2d. 331 (4th Cir. 1983).
61. See, e.g., New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 297-98
(N.DTN.Y. 1984) (costs of investigation "are clearly authorized as costs of response"); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (listing preliminary investigations and planning
of response action as response costs); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,
1110 & n.5 (D.N.J. 1983) (complaint might have been sufficient had plaintiff
alleged the costs of investigation and preparing a feasibility study).
In General Electr
an action brought by the government under
§ 9607(a)(4)(A), the District Court for the Northern District of New York at-

tempted to distinguish CadillacFairview and D'Imperio,see supra note 60, on
the ground that those cases involved private party claims under
§ 9607(a)(4)(B). To support that distinction, the court made the conclusory
statement that § 9607(a)(4)(B) "establishes significantly different cost recovery
criteria." GeneralElec., 592 F. Supp. at 298. There is no basis for such a distinction, either logically or in the definitional section of CERCLA. See supra
notes 54-58 and accompanying text. Response costs are the same whether incurred by the government or by a private party. The only difference is the
standard of proof required and, possibly, the party bearing the burden of

proof. See supra note 52.
62. See Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437,
1447-48 (S.D. Fla. 1984) ("CERCLA's emphasis [is] on response first and reimbursement second"); State ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1316
(N.D. Ohio 1983) ("[rlesponse actions were not intended to await a determination of liability").
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dismissing the complaint on grounds that it is not ripe for re-

view or that it fails to state a claim.6 3 This approach ignores
the clear language of the statute, which defines response to include preliminary investigations.64 Moreover, to deny recovery
for preliminary cleanup activities deprives affected plaintiffs of
a portion of the costs to which they legitimately are entitled
and ultimately will discourage private parties from initiating
65
cleanup actions.
A compromise approach is necessary to strike a balance between encouraging response first and reimbursement later and
allowing plaintiffs to recover all the costs to which they are entitled. Some courts have resolved the problem by adopting a
"ripening" approach: investigatory costs are initially deemed
insufficient to support a claim, but once the actual cleanup has
begun, they "ripen" into response costs. 66 For example, one
court stated that "[o]nce a claimant has begun to implement a
. . .cleanup program, then those preliminary costs, heretofore
non-recoverable (e.g., expenses for legal, architectural, engineering, and other planning) may be recaptured.' 67 Although
this "ripening" approach is not grounded in the literal language
of the statute,68 the statute does not preclude this treatment.
Preliminary expenses really are not "necessary" unless the
cleanup plan is carried out. This "ripening" approach encourages at least partial cleanup of problem areas before liability is
apportioned and allows plaintiffs to recover the full amount to
63.

See Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437,

1450 (S.D. Fla. 1984); Cadillac Fairview/California v. Dow Chem. Co., 14
ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,376, 20,381, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1108,
1118 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 1984); D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248, 253
(D.N.J. 1983); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 12 ENvTL. L.
REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20,843, 20,844 (E.D. Va.May 14, 1982).
64. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
65. Preliminary investigations can be quite expensive. For example, in
Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Cal. 1984), the
plaintiff spent $150,000 just to determine the extent of its hazardous waste
problem. Id at 76.
66. See, e.g., Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437,
1452 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
67. Id
68. The statute could be interpreted literally to mean that a given expenditure either is or is not a response cost. Under such an interpretation, the
"ripening" approach would be improper. The practical implications of such a
strict construction, however, make its adoption undesirable. Furthermore, to
read the language of the statute in this way would be contrary to CERCLA's
dual purposes of promoting rapid response to hazardous situations and placing
the financial burden on responsible parties. See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F.
Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
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which they are legitimately entitled. It thus strikes a reasonable compromise between competing CERCLA policies and
should be adopted by other courts.
III. RESPONSE COSTS "INCURRED" IN CLEANUPS
Before commencing a private cost recovery action, a plaintiff must have actually "incurred" response costs. 69 Whether a

given expenditure constitutes an "incurred" response cost is
largely dependent on the court's definition of "response cost."
Since the costs of conducting preliminary investigations and
drafting cleanup proposals either are not response costs, or only
ripen into response costs at a later time,70 courts agree that
"[t]he actual clean up of the release must have begun before a
'
cost recovery action can be reviewed."7
At that point, a plaintiff may recover the costs expended, including investigatory
costs if the jurisdiction considers them response costs and the
costs of services contracted for but not yet performed. 72 A
plaintiff also may obtain a declaratory judgment on the issue of
liability for any future expenditures necessary but not yet con73
tracted for.

The question then becomes how much actual cleaning up
has to be done before a court will entertain a private cost recovery action. This is a particularly important consideration given
the potentially massive costs associated with the cleanup of hazardous waste sites.7 4 Few companies have the resources necessary to completely fund a large, unilateral cleanup, even if they
expect to be partially reimbursed at some future date.
The EPA guidelines for cost recovery actions under section
9607(a) (4) (A) state that the Agency may commence an action
69. See Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437,
1451 (S1). Fla. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249,
1259 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D.N.J.
1983); D'Imperio v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 248, 253 (D.N.J. 1983); State ex
reL Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1316 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
70. See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
71. Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1451
(SD. Fla. 1984); see also Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D.
Ohio 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249,1259 (SD.
1l. 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1110 (D.N.J. 1983); State er
reL Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1316 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
72. See United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
73. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 852 (W.D. Mo. 1984); State ex reL Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp.
1300, 1315 (NMD. Ohio 1983).
74. See supra note 24.
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after the completion of either the entire cleanup operation or
"one phase of a multi-phase response. ' 75 This comports with
CERCLA's policy of encouraging response first and reimbursement later. Private parties, however, should not be required to
complete the cleanup prior to filing suit. The EPA guidelines
reflect a policy choice made by an agency with $1.6 billion to
draw on for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. For reasons
of administrative efficiency, it makes sense for the EPA to complete a cleanup once it has begun and then seek recovery from
responsible parties to replenish the Fund. A private party, on
the other hand, must finance a cleanup out of its own, more
limited reserves. Requiring a company to finance the entire actual cleanup, or even a large portion of it, after it has already
funded the entire investigatory stage may leave many companies with the difficult choice of either ignoring the hazardous
waste problem or funding a cleanup that may threaten it with
bankruptcy.7 6 This is particularly unfair given the company's
claim that it is only partially responsible for the problem.
CERCLA was intended to place the financial burden of the
cleanup on all the parties responsible for the problem, not just
on those parties that initiate the cleanup. 77 Accordingly, the
75. EPA, MEMORANDUM ON COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER CERCLA
(Aug. 26, 1983), reprinted in ENV'T REP. (BNA), Federal Laws Index 41:2861,
41:2864-65. An example of "one phase of a multi-phase response" is a completed surface cleanup with planned later cleanup of the subsurface or groundwater. Id
76. In Bulk Distribution Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437
(S.D. Fla. 1984), Bulk argued that a unilateral cleanup would force it into
bankruptcy. Id. at 1452. The court, after finding the potential bankruptcy
claim "unsubstantiated," noted that even if "this were true, then the federal or
state governments would have the option of interceding and cleaning up the
site, and later moving to recover clean-up costs from other responsible parties." Id. at 1452 n.29. The court apparently was satisfied that despite Bulk's
bankruptcy, the other responsible parties still would be held liable. The
court's casual attitude toward the company's financial problems obscures a major problem in these types of cases. From the company's standpoint, and that
of the local community, bankruptcy is not a trivial matter and should be
avoided if at all possible. Furthermore, from the standpoint of protecting public health and the environment, forcing a company into bankruptcy is likely to
delay or destroy any cleanup effort at the site. The EPA is dealing with the
hazardous waste problem on a "worst case first" basis and cannot be responsible for cleaning up every spill or problem area. EPA encourages private actions whenever possible in order to conserve both administrative time and
limited Superfund money. See Daniel, Guidelines for Using the Imminent
Hazard,Enforcemen and Emergency Response Authorities of Superfund and
Other Statutes, 47 Fed. Reg. 20,664, 20,665 (1982).
77. See Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D. Ohio 1984)
(noting that "[t]o require either the government or a private party to complete
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more equitable rule, adopted by several courts,7 8 is that a claimant need incur only a nominal portion of the "actual cleanup"

costs before the court will entertain its claim for response costs.
IV. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO
PRIVATE COST RECOVERY ACTIONS
Courts also disagree with respect to whether the notice
provision contained in section 9612 of CERCLA applies to private cost recovery actions. Section 9612(a) provides:
All claims which may be asserted against the Fund pursuant to section 9611 of this title shall be presented in the first instance to the [responsible parties]. In any case where the claim has not been satisfied
within sixty days of presentation in accordance with this subsection,
the claimant may elect to commence an action in court against such
[responsible
parties] or to present the claim to the Fund for
79
payment.

Several courts have held that section 9612(a) applies to cost recovery actions under section 9607(a) and therefore have imposed a sixty day notice requirement on plaintiffs bringing
suit.8 0 The only court that has explained its holding argued
that to not read the two sections together would be inefficient
and costly because it would permit one party to act unilaterally
when a joint effort might have been possible if the parties had
attempted to settle their differences before undertaking a
cleanup. 8 ' This argument is unpersuasive, however, because requiring notice does not prevent unilateral action or ensure joint
cleanup prior to filing suit would defeat the dual purposes of CERCLA to promote rapid response to hazardous situations and to place the financial burden
on the responsible parties").
78. See, e.g., Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F Supp. 1425, 1430 (S.D. Ohio
1984) (complaint sufficient because it "allege[d] that they [had] already incurred some portion of the response costs necessary to clean up the site");
United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1259 (S.D. IM. 1984)
(rejecting argument that entire cleanup must be completed before costs are recoverable, court stated that "§ 9607 only requires that some costs be incurred
before an action can be maintained"); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103,
1110 (D.N.J. 1983) ("§ [9607] was intended to cover only those instances where
the [plaintiff] had already begun the clean-up process and was seeking reimbursement"); State ex reL Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300, 1316 (N.D.
Ohio 1983) (claim allowed where state had already incurred response costs of
$825,000, even though cleanup was only 10% complete).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 9612(a).
80. See Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437,
1448 (S.D. Fla. 1984); United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205,
1207 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc.,
588 F. Supp. 515, 517 (D. Mass. 1983);
81. Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1449
(S.D. Fla. 1984).

1158

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1135

cleanup efforts. The notice requirement governs when claims
can be made, not when cleanups can be undertaken. Even with
a notice requirement, a party could clean up the entire site
before bringing suit.
Those courts that require notice disagree concerning the
information that the notice must contain. One court has held
that the notice of claim must be a demand for a "sum certain, '8 2 which it defined as "a clear statement of the past and
future costs of the response activity broken down into general
categories. 8 3 Another court has taken a more pragmatic approach, allowing "substantial compliance" with the sum certain
requirement on the grounds that it would be unreasonable to
expect a plaintiff to claim a definite sum of money given the
84
unclear and possibly undiscoverable extent of the damages.
This court concluded that the purpose of the demand letter was
to put the defendant on notice of a potential claim and not to
give a clear indication of the potential cleanup costs. 85
Other courts have rejected the notice requirement altogether, holding instead that section 9607(a) is independent of
section 9612(a). 86 This approach best effectuates the policies
underlying the Act. The express language of section 9612(a) is
limited to "claims which may be asserted against the Fund pursuant to section 9611."87 In most private cost recovery actions,
plaintiffs will not have claims that may be asserted against the
Fund, either because they are responsible parties,8 8 or because
they failed to obtain government preauthorization of the
cleanup. 89 Moreover, the express language of section 9607(a)
imposes liability on responsible parties "notwithstanding any
other provision or rule of law," 90 which suggests the section
82.

CERCLA defines "claim" as "a demand in writing for a sum certain."

42 U.S.C. § 9601(4).
83. Bulk Distrib. Centers, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 589 F. Supp. 1437, 1449
(S.D. Fla. 1984).
84. United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 587 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 (N.D. Cal.

1984).
85. I&
86. See, e.g., New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 299o301
(N.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co.,
579 F. Supp. 823, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1984); Wehner v. Syntex Corp., 14 ENVTL. L.
REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 20,265, 20,266 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 30, 1983); United States v.
Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (D. Minn. 1982).

87.
88.
89.
90.

42 U.S.C. § 9612(a).
See supra note 19.
See supra note 20.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
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was meant to stand by itself.91 Furthermore, the policy underlying the notification requirement does not apply when the
claim is being made against a responsible party rather than
against the Fund. Notification was intended to conserve the
limited assets of the Superfund by encouraging the responsible
party to pay for the cleanup before a plaintiff makes a claim
against the Fund.9 2 In this respect, the CERCLA notification
requirement is different from the notice provisions of other environmental statutes such as the Clean Water Act 93 or the
Clean Air Act,94 which reflect a preference for initial administrative rather than private action.95 To effectuate the policies
underlying CERCLA, therefore, the notice provision in section
9612 should not be applied to private cost recovery actions
under section 9607.
CONCLUSION
As more privately-funded cleanups are conducted, private
cost recovery litigation becomes increasingly significant. This
Note suggests a resolution of the four major areas of disagreement among the courts concerning the manner and procedures
by which such actions should proceed. Courts should require
prior government approval of private cleanup plans whenever
feasible, but should except from prior approval good faith, voluntary cleanups in cases in which the party initiating cleanup
was unaware that prior approval was required. Preliminary
costs, such as those incurred while investigating the scope of
the hazardous waste problem or preparing a cleanup plan, initially should be deemed insufficient to support a claim but
should be recoverable once -the actual cleanup has begun.
Given that complete private cleanups may be very expensive,
courts should also permit claims to go forward once nominal
amounts have been spent in actually cleaning up the site. Finally, the notice provisions that apply to a party making a claim
91. See United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 579 F.
Supp. 823, 850 (WI). Mo. 1984); Welmer v. Syntax Corp., 14 ENVTL. I- REP.
(ENVTL. L. INST.) 20265, 20266 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 30, 1983); United States v. Reilly
Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1118 (D. Minn. 1982).
92. See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 300 (N.D.N.Y.
1984) ("the purpose of CERCLA seems only to require notice in order to facilitate negotiated settlements").

93. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
95. See New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 300 (N.D.N.Y.
1994).
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against the Fund should not apply to a party seeking recovery
from other responsible parties. Adoption of these suggestions
will enable the privately funded cleanup to be used as a valuable complement to government response actions and will assist
in remedying the serious hazardous waste problem in the
United States.
Paul W. Heiring

